Abstract. Context-aware systems acquire and integrate multi-faceted knowledge about their environments in order to make decisions. A number of attempts to build frameworks for context-aware systems have been made, but these have not provided adequate support for context-aware access control. In this paper, we present a framework for context-aware access control and its prototype implementation. The framework includes a context model for classifying and capturing access control-oriented contextual information, a situation model for identifying and defining contextual conditions of concern, and a policy model for specifying context-aware access control policies.
Introduction
Computer systems have shifted from fixed desktop environments to pervasive computing environments in which, as Weiser [1] describes, resources or services should be available for the life of everyday users in an 'anywhere, anytime' fashion even when they are on the move. A key challenge in such pervasive environments is the control over access to these resources or services. Unlike traditional access control, access control decisions in pervasive environments need to take into account the relevant contextual information such as time and location that reflect the dynamically changing conditions of the environments [2) .
Access control is a mechanism to determine whether a request to access resources in a system should be permitted or denied. The traditional access control models (e.g., [3] ) do not provide adequate functionality to adapt to and incorporate dynamically changing contexts. More recently, a number of research efforts (e.g., [4] [5] [6] ) have attempted to design access control models that consider context information, focusing on time and location. In general, there are also other types of environmental factors or context information that need to be considered. Wben considering whether or not a doctor can access a patient's medical records, for example, the purpose of the request, the health condition of the patient and the relationship between the doctor and the patient (treating physician or not) are all possible additional factors that need to be considered beyond the time and location of the particular request.
In this paper, we introduce a general framework for context-aware access control. It has three major components: an access control-oriented context model for classifying and capturing contextual infonnation, a situation model for identifying and defining relevant environmental or contextual conditions, and a policy model for defining context-aware access control policies. A prototype has been developed to realize this framework.
Research motivation
As an example of the type of situations that a context-aware access control model has to be considered, let us consider the following scenario: Normally, only a patient's treating physician is able to access the patient's medical records. In the above emergency scenario, Jane, while not being the treating physician, needs to access and should be given access to Bob's medical records. The relevant contextual infonnation concerning the above scenario of access control include: Jane's personal role is 'Resident Doctor', Jane is located in the 'EmergencyRoom' where Bob is, Bob's current health state is 'Critical', and Jane's relationship to Bob is that of 'NonTreatingPhysician' . In addition, the purpose of Jane's request for accessing Bob's medical records is for' Treatment'. In making this access control decision, all these factors need to be taken into account. Furthennore, when the situation changes (e.g., Bob has come out of emergency and moved to a hospital ward), decisions on further access requests by Jane to Bob's medical records may change accordingly (e.g., denied).
To support such context-aware access control in a computer application like the medical record management system, we need to consider the 4Ws: who (user) wants to access what (resources), when (current contexts), and why (purpose for resource access). In particular, a general framework is required to manage the access to resources in such applications by taking into account the different types of changing environmental factors that impact on the access control decisions. The framework should support (0 different types of context information, (ii) different types of purpose-oriented situations, and (iii) context-aware access control policy rules.
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Related work
Wang et al [7] have proposed an OWL encoded CONtext ONtology (CONON) for modeling context information in pervasive environments. The CONON ontology helps to share a common understanding of the structure of contextual infonnation concerning users, places, and devices in order to support semantic interoperability and reuse of domain knowledge. Henricksen et al [8] have developed a Context Modeling Language (CML) and a tool that translates CML-based context models to an OWL representation for the purpose of utilizing the OWL technology. However, these existing general context models do not provide direct support for concepts related to access control such as resource owners, or for relationships between context entities such as that between the resource requester and the resource owner.
The research presented in [7, 8] considers the concept of situation as a means to identify high-level context information (user activities/states). In making access control decisions, however, in addition to the state of the user, the states of the resource, its owner and environment are also important considerations. Furthermore, the purpose of resource access is also part of the consideration.
The generalized role based access control model GRBAC [4] is an extension of the traditional role based access control (RBAC) model [3] by introducing the notions of subject, object and envirorunent roles, where the environment roles are used to model the environmental context (day time, night time, etc.). The GEO-RBAC model [5] also extends the RBAC model, where authorizations to access resources are based on the assigned role and location of the user. Toninelli et al [6] have proposed a contextaware access control framework that provides resource access permission based on such factors as resources availabiHty, actor roles/identities and environmental conditions (such as time, other available resources, etc.). These existing research efforts either consider only specific types of context infonnation or do not provide a classification of the relevant contextual factors for access control. As such, none of the existing context-aware access control approaches sufficiently support the requirements identified in Section 2.
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A context-aware framework for access control
Our context-aware framework for access control supports the following three phases of developing context-aware access control applications: modeling context, modeling situation. and modeling context-aware access control policy.
Representation and modeling of context
The most accepted definition of context is given by Dey [2] . However, this definition is not specific enough for access control as it does not identify the access controlspecific entities. From the running application scenario, we can see that the access control entities are user, resource, resource owner and their environments. We specialize Dey's definition of context to cover access control applications as follows:
'Context information} used in an access control decision is defined as any relevant information about the state of a relevant entity (user, resource, resource owner and their environments) or the state of a relevant relationship between the entities.
Focusing on the context information relevant to making access control decisions, we classify context entities as follows:
• User context is any relevant information about the user or resource requester, who makes a request, e.g., the user's Identity and Role;
• Resource context is any relevant infonnation about the resource, which is being requested, e.g., the PrivacyAttribute of resource information;
• Owner context is any relevant information about the resource owner, e.g., the owner's Identity and Category;
• Environment context is any relevant information about the environments of the resource, owner and user j e.g., the Status of the Emergency Room at a specific time.
We have further classified the environment entities into the following subcategories:
• Temporal environment context -information about time characteristics, e.g., RequestTime;
• Spatial environment context -information about location characteristics, e.g.) LocationAddress;
• Spatio-temporal environment context -infonnation that is about a specific location at a particular time, e.g., the Status of the Emergency Room at a specific time;
• Social environment context -information about relationships between entities, e.g., the Relationship between the user and the resource owner;
• Other environment context -information other than the above four types of environment entities, e.g., the HealthState of a patient, which is deduced based on the patient's medical data possibly obtained through wearable sensors.
We have created a conceptual context model to represent our definition and classification of access control-oriented context. Ontology has been used to represent context models in several research works (e.g., [7] ) due to its expressiveness and capability for fonnal representation and reasoning. We also adopt an ontology-based representation of our context model. Figure 1 presents a high-level ontology model for our entity-based context model, where the superclass-subclass relationships between context entities are represented using the 'is-a j (is a subclass of) properties, and the other relationships using 'user-defined' properties. The context entities (classes) are organized into a hierarchy. User, Resource, Resource Owner and Environment are the four main context entities in the hierarchy. The Environment entity is related to the other three main entities, and is further specialized into its sub-classes.
For a particular context-aware access control application, the above context model can be instantiated to capture the application-specific context entities and information, i.e., resulting in a domain/application-specific context modeL For the motivating scenario, for example, we have some of context entities and information as follows:
• The user's ldenaty and Role are part of the context information about the User (Jane and ResidentDoctor). Her LocationAddress and RequestTime are context infonnation concerning the user's Spatial and Temporal environments.
• The PrivacyAttribute of Bob's medical records is part of the context information about the Resource (Bob's medical records).
• The resource owner's Identity and Category are part of the context information about the Owner (Bob, Patient). • The patient (Bob) is an environment entity relevant to the access request. His LocationAddress and HealthState are part of the Spatial and Other context infonnation concerning the patient. Note that Bob is both the resource owner and the patient in this case; in general, however, this does not have to be the case (e.g., the medical records of the patient's mother may need to be consulted in certain situations).
• The Relationship (NonTreatingPhysician) between Jane and Bob is context information about the Social environments of Jane and Bob .
• The Status of the Emergency Room at 3:00 pm on 18 January 2012 is part of the context infonnation about the Spatio-temporal context entity EmergencyRoom.
Representation of situation
In the context-aware literature (e.g., [7] ), existing situation definitions typically describe the state or activity of the user. However, these definitions are limited when considering access control in pervasive environments, where a user can access a resource from a particular environment (e.g., a patient is in a critical health condition) for a certain purpose. In addition to the state of the user, the states of the resource, its owner and their environments are also important considerations. Our definition of purpose-oriented situation is as follows: A 'situation} is defined as a specific subset of the complete state of the universe of access control entities that are relevant to a certain goal or purpose of a resource access request. Here, the universe of access control entities is fonned or defined by the context entities from the context model. A situation is a set of values whose types are defined by a domain-specific context model. These values are detennined by what the system needs to know given its current state in order to make the access control decision.
Our purpose-oriented situation model S is defIned using a tuple as follows:
where p is the purpose, and Cj (i = I, 2, 3, ... ) are the states of relevant entities with each relevant entity attribute taking on a specific value. The situation to capture the access control condition from the motivating scenario can be defined as follows: 
Representation of context-aware access policies
Our context-aware policy model uses an identified situation as a condition to make context-aware access control decisions. When a user sends a request to access resources, the required situation or condition needs to be identified and evaluated based on the relevant context infonnation.
Our access control policies are essentially security policies related to access control decision making and they specify whether a subject is permitted or denied access to a set of target objects for their specific action or sequence of actions, when a set of con- Situation Inference Engine (SIE). A CP receives the low-level, raw context data from the physical or logical sensors, and then generates the context information. (Note that in our prototype, Java programs are used to simulate the physical and logical sensors.) We have used the Protege-OWL graphical ontology API! to implement the context model (context ontologies). We have implemented the CI to deduce high-level context information from low-level context information. To define and identify situations, we have used SWRL 2 rules. The Jess Rule Engine 3 is used to implement SIE for executing the SWRL rules. The Service Layer uses an identified situation from SIE as a condition to evaluate context-aware policies stored in the Policy Database. XACML is used as a policy language, and Sun XACML 4 is used as XACML engine. Referring back to our motivating scenario from Section 2, the sensors provide the raw context data (i.e., the information about Jane, Bob, Emergency Room, etc) for CP to convert to properly formatted context information. Then, the CI infers additional high-level context information such as Bob's health state. The context ontology database receives and records both the low-level and high-level context information. The identified situations are defined in SWRL and stored in the situation rules database. The access control policies for the healthcare application are defined using XACML and are stored in the policy database. When Jane's request for accessing Bob's medi- cal records comes, the SIE is asked to evaluate the access condition (situation) using the relevant context information in the context ontology database. As the condition is evaluated to be true, the system grants Jane access to Bob's medical records.
Conclusion
The use of context is important in many access control applications, where users can only access certain resources depending on the prevailing contextual conditions.
In this paper, we have introduced a framework for context-aware access control, incorporating context into access control policies, so that when a user sends a request to access resources, the access control decision can take into account the relevant situation present. Its key components include an access control oriented context model, a purpose-oriented situation model, and a context-aware access control policy model. As future work, we intend to test our framework in various real-world application domains.
